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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the determinants of capital adequacy ratio in the banking sector of 
Greece. The study is based on banks’ quarterly reports and data from Bankscope and 
ThomsonOne. The data is spanning fifteen years around the period 2001-2015 and includes 
the four largest systemic Greek banks, since their assets represent more than 90 percent of 
the Greek banking system. The results are from unbalanced panel data and a random-effect 
model is used. Findings suggest that there is a positive correlation between return on assets, 
asset structure, inflation and capital adequacy ratio, while net interest margin, non-
performing loans and unemployment have negative correlation with capital adequacy ratio. 
Return on assets, net interest margin, and inflation do not have an influence on how the 
capital adequacy ratio is determined. Non-performing loans, asset structure and 
unemployment seems to have a strong impact on capital adequacy ratio of Greek banks. 
Although this paper is focused on Greek economy, it may help identify the correlates of 
bank capital ratios in the surrounding regions of Balkan.  
 
Keywords: Capital Adequacy Ratio, Determinants of CAR, Greece  
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Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 was just one of the many crises that afflicted the global economy 
over time. Financial crises occur for several reasons, but in the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
many financial crises were associated with banking panics. The need for rules and 
restrictions that would be followed by banks worldwide became an urgent need.  
The collapse of the German bank “Herstatt” on June 1974, and then of the US’s bank 
“Franklin National” in October of the same year, focused the interest of the financial 
authorities to the cooperation between individual national banking systems. As a result of 
this turmoil, in the end 1974 it was established a Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices, which later renamed the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.1 
Since then the Basel Committee is working on developing banking regulation rules. The 
latest amendment was introduced after the financial crisis of 2007-08, and it brought 
several innovations concerning banking risk regulation. Extra capital buffers were 
introduced (the capital conservation buffer), the minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
requirement begins at 60% in 2015, rising in equal annual steps of 10 percentage points to 
reach 100% on 1 January 2019, finally the unweighted capital ratio was introduced to be 
monitored in parallel the risk-weighted ratio.2 
In 1998 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduces the Cooke Ratio, which is 
the minimum amount of capital a bank should maintain in case of unexpected losses. The 
Cooke Ratio has two objectives a) to provide a balance between the capital hold by the 
banks and the taken risk and b) strengthen the soundness and stability of the banking 
system. It is measured as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The risk weighted assets are defined as the banks’ assets weighted by its risk weight. The 
risk weight assets are computed using the following formula: 
                                                          
1Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), “A Brief History of the Basel Committee”, p. 1. 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf)  
2Henry Penikas, History of banking regulation as developed by the Basel Committee on banking supervision in 
1974–2014, pp. 16-17. 
(http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/RevistaEstabilidadFin
anciera/15/MAYO%202015/restfin2015281.pdf)  
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𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
The original Basel Accord uses only credit risk and classifies banks’ exposures into four 
categories as we can see in table 1. Cash, claims on OECD central governments and claims 
on central governments in national currency are risk weighted at 0%. Claims to be received, 
claims on OECD banks, on non-OECD banks below one year, claims on multinational 
development banks and claims on foreign OECD public-sector entities are risk weighted at 
20%. Residential mortgage loans are risk weighted at 50%. Claims on the private sector, 
claims on non-OECD banks above one year, real estate and plant and equipment are risk 
weighted at 100%. 
Table 1. Four categories of banks exposures according to the original Basel Accord. 
 
The available options that are at one’s disposal for computing capital for credit risk are 
Standardised Approach, Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach and Advanced Internal 
Rating Based Approach. The available options for computing capital for operational risk are 
Basic Indicator Approach, The Standardised Approach and Advanced Measurement 
Approach.3 Table 2 presents the time schedule for the implementation of the advanced 
approaches for the regulatory capital measurement in July 2009. 
                                                          
3 https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/114BI010714LA.pdf p. 6. 
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Table 2. Schedule for the implementation of the advanced approaches for the regulatory capital measurement 
in July 2009. 
 
The purpose of bank regulation is to ensure that a bank keeps enough capital for the risks it 
takes.4 Governments want to create stable economic environment for individuals and 
businesses, in order to inspire confidence in the banking system, and if it is necessary the 
government bears the risks and potential losses of a disruption in the banking system (“Too 
Big to Fail” policy, lender of last resort, forbearance). However, some financial institutions 
disregard the measures proposed by the Basel Committee, which in some circumstances has 
cause their failure. Still, the “Too Big to Fail” policy did not work for the Lehman Brothers 
during the turmoil of 2007 and 2008. The U.S government wanted to make it clear that 
bailouts for large financial institutions were not automatic.5 
The Basel III capital requirements are based on three mutually reinforcing pillars: minimum 
capital requirements, supervisory review of capital adequacy, and market discipline of the 
Basel II capital adequacy framework. A bank should comply with the capital adequacy ratio 
requirements at two levels: a) the consolidated level, which measures the capital adequacy 
of a bank based on its capital strength and risk profile after consolidating the assets and 
liabilities of its subsidiaries, b) the standalone level capital adequacy ratio requirements, 
which measure the capital adequacy of a bank based in its standalone capital strength and 
risk profile.6 
                                                          
4John C. Hull, Risk Management and Financial Institutions, published by John Wiley & Sons, third edition, 2012, 
p. 257.  
5John C. Hull, Risk Management and Financial Institutions, published by John Wiley & Sons, third edition, 2012, 
p. 258.  
6https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/114BI010714LA.pdf p.  8. 
8 
 
Why banks are required to hold capital? 
A banks’ market capital requirement can be defined as the capital ratio that maximizes the 
value of a bank in the absence of regulatory capital requirements. This capital ratio may 
differ among banks, but it is the ratio each bank should converge towards to in the long run. 
It is worth to mention that the value of a bank will decline whether it has too little or too 
much capital.7  
The convergence point for the literature on capital structure is the Modigliani-Miller (1958) 
proposition, which states that in a world of full information and complete markets, a firm’s 
capital structure cannot affect its value. In order to research the optimal capital structure, 
we need to examine the imperfections that are inherent in the M&M proposition, such as 
taxes, cost of financial distress, transactions costs and asymmetry information problems.  
As it is known, interest payments are tax-deductible but dividends are not, so by 
substituting debt for equity firms can give investors greater return by reducing payments to 
the government. Financial institutions prefer to finance their activities with debt, but in that 
way the risk of incurring the costs of financial distress increases. The level at which the tax 
advantages of additional debt are offset by the increase in the expected costs of financial 
distress determines the optimal capital structure.8 
According to NASDAQ, financial distress is “Events preceding and including bankruptcy, such 
as violation loan contracts”.9 Financial distress has many negative aspects, banks lose value, 
talented employees may leave, revenues will decrease, and suppliers may demand more 
timely payments. Part of the costs of financial distress are borne by the banks’ creditors and 
part by shareholders. Creditors may increase the interest rate they require and in turn 
shareholders may increase the banks’ capital ratio to the point that the expected costs of 
financial distress offset the reduction in the tax benefits of debt. 
“Asymmetric information refers to situations, in which some agent in a trade possesses 
information while other agents involved in the same trade do not”.10 The information held 
                                                          
7 Allen N. Berger, Richard J. Herring, Giorgio P. Szego, The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, Working 
Paper 95-01, January 1995, p.3 
8 Allen N. Berger, Richard J. Herring, Giorgio P. Szego, The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, Working 
Paper 95-01, January 1995, p.4 
9 http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/f/financial-distress  
10 World Bank http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-
1114437274304/Asymmetric_Info_Sep2003.pdf  
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by banks about their loan customers creates an asymmetric information problem for banks. 
Banks have more information about their financial condition than the market, which can 
send signals to the market that can be interpreted in different ways. The decision about 
funding the new investments with debt or equity send signal to investors and they act in a 
specified way. 
The financial crisis of 2007 and the capital adequacy ratio 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 triggered the Greek sovereign debt crisis in the late 2009. The 
falsification of national accounts led to a crisis of confidence. Spreads on bond yield 
increased and credit rating agencies downgraded Greece’s debt to “junk” (BB+).11 The 
government-debt crisis deteriorated the banking system. The number of branches and 
employees of domestic credit institutions reduced from 4.098 and 66.16312 respectively, 
before the crisis, to 2.543 and 46.086 in 2015.13 
When the financial crisis of 2007-08 broke out, the spillover effects on the Greek banking 
system were limited; it remained healthy and adequately capitalized until the effects of the 
global recession affected the Greek economy. The public debt crisis in Greece resulted in 
substantial decline in the capital adequacy ratio of Greek banks. In the first quarter of 2012 
the capital adequacy ratio on a consolidated basis fell to 5.2%, a far below the minimum 
level of 8%. This situation resulted in several tranches of funds to be directed into troubled 
commercial banks. 
Capital controls were introduced in Greece in June 2015, after the negotiations with its 
European creditors had been suspended, with both sides accusing each other of being 
responsible. As a result, European Central Bank decided not to further increase the level of 
its Emergency Liquidity Assistance for Greek Banks. Depositors were allowed to withdraw 
420€ per week or 60€ a day. People responded almost instantly to the news; Greek people 
formed lengthy queues at ATMs during the weekend as it became clear that the country was 
very close to default.  
These circumstances highlighted the problem of the Greek banking system (as well as many 
other European countries) which was historically conservative and well-capitalized, and 
                                                          
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8647441.stm  
12http://www.hba.gr/4Statistika/UplPDFs/6/7.12.2011%20ECB%20publishes%20structural%20financial%20indi
cators%20for%202010%20%20-%20Table%20.pdf  
13 https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/servlet/desis?node=1000002869  
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stricter regulation and supervision were considered necessary to make the banking sector 
healthy again.  
This paper seeks to examine the determinants of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) in the greek 
banking sector. The analysis includes data before and after the financial crisis of 2007-08, in 
order to compare and examine the effects of the crisis to the banks’ solvency. Through this 
research we will be able to understand the importance of the capital adequacy ratio and the 
consequences a bank has with a CAR lower than the minimum of 8%. 
It is important to review the capital ratios of Greek banks, due to the consequences of the 
sovereign crisis on banking sector. The successive downgrades of the credit rating, the 
restructuring of the public debt through the participation of the private sector, the 
deterioration of the quality of the loan portfolios of Greek banks, and the banks’ lack of 
access to international capital markets have negatively affected the capital and liquidity of 
Greek banks.14 
Capital adequacy ratio is important to determine the solvency of a bank. If the banking 
system were to go bankrupt, the entire economy would collapse, hence regulatory bodies 
are interfering to enforce capital ratios. Also, CAR impacts the amount of credit that can be 
created by the banks. Debates on whether the capital adequacy ratios contribute or not to 
financial crises reveal the importance of CAR as well.  
Banks are required to maintain a minimum Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio of 8%. It 
should be ensured that the capital held by a bank is commensurate with the bank’s overall 
risk profile. This would include, among others, the effectiveness of the bank’s risk 
management systems in identifying, assessing / measuring, monitoring and managing 
various risks including interest rate risk in the banking book, liquidity risk, concentration risk 
and residual risk.15 If it is necessary, higher level of capital ratio will be set for each bank in 
respective to their risk profiles.  
Components of Capital  
A bank should compute Basel III capital ratio as: 
                                                          
14Banking Regulation, Global Legal Law, p. 113. (http://www.potamitisvekris.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/GLI-BR2_Greece.pdf). 
15https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/114BI010714LA.pdf p.10.  
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 =
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑊𝐴 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑊𝐴 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑊𝐴
 
The elements of banks’ capital adequacy are the level of equity, that include economic, 
regulatory and internal capital, and solvency ratio. Banks’ capital is divided into core capital 
(Tier 1), supplementary capital (Tier 2) and short term capital (Tier 3). Subsequently, Tier 1 
capital consists of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) which, in turn, consists of: 
a) Common shares issued by the bank that meet the criteria for the classification for as 
common shares for regulatory purposes 
b) Stock surplus resulting from the issue if instruments including CET1 
c) Retained earnings 
d) Accumulated other comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves 
e) Common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third 
parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in CET1 
f) Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of CET1 
Tier 1 capital includes paid-up capital, statutory reserves, disclosed free reserves, Perpetual 
Non-Cumulative Preference Shares, Innovative Perpetual Debt Instruments and capital 
reserves representing surplus arising out of sale proceeds of asset. Tier 2 capital includes 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions and loss reserves, hybrid 
capital instruments, subordinated debt and investment reserve account.  Finally, Tier 3 
capital is arranged to meet part of market size, that is changes in interest rate, exchange 
rate, equity prices, commodity prices, etc. To quantify Tier 3 capital, assets must be limited 
to 250% of a bank’s Tier 1 capital, be unsecured subordinated and have a minimum maturity 
of 2 years.16 
After the creation of the European Banking Union, the EU institutions agreed to establish a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism for banks. In turn, the 
Greek banking law has been greatly modified to comply with the EU legislation. 
                                                          
16 Nikhat Fatima, Capital Adequacy: A Financial Soundness Indicator for Banks, Global Journal of Finance and 
Management, Volume 6, Number 8 (2004) p. 772. 
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Furthermore, the “Hellenic Bank Support Plan” was adopted, with the goal of enhancing 
Greek banks’ capital and liquidity positions.17 
The capital structure of banks differs greatly from non-financial institutions. Banks act as 
financial intermediaries and additionally they can fund their activities through deposits. The 
structure of the Greek banking system has notably changed during the last decades in 
respond to the changes in international economic/financial environment. In Greece Piraeus 
Bank is the largest bank by total assets (2015)18, and together with National Bank of Greece, 
Alpha Bank and Eurobank Ergasias represent the four systemic Greek banks. 
According to the EU capital requirements (CRD IV) package, that entered into force in 2013, 
the minimum total capital ratio for Greek banks is 8% composed of a Common Equity Tier I 
capital ratio of 4.5% with the overall minimum Tier I capital ratio being 6%. Additionally, 
Greek banks are required to increase the capital conservation buffer to 2.5% by 2019, the 
minimum Common Equity Tier I capital to 7% and the total capital ratio to 10.5% in 2019.19 
Also, a countercyclical buffer of up to 2.5% must be held as expansion of the capital 
conservation buffer, so the banking sector is protected in a case of excessive credit 
expansion.  
Except for the above capital ratios, the Banking Law requires a minimum paid-up initial 
capital equal to: 1.  €18,000,000 for a Greek credit institution; 2.  €9,000,000 for a branch of 
a credit institution authorised in a third country; and 3. €6,000,000 for the pure credit 
cooperative of Greek law 1667/1986.  The above thresholds may be adjusted by the 
competent authority to amounts of not less than €5,000,000.20 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 literature review and main concepts that are 
used through the study. Section 3 describes data and the methodology used to approach 
the empirical work. Sections 4 and 5 present and analyse the empirical results. Finally, 
conclusions and recommendations are provided in section 6. 
                                                          
17Banking Regulation, Global Legal Law, p. 113. (http://www.potamitisvekris.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/GLI-BR2_Greece.pdf).  
18 http://www.hba.gr/Hebic/UplPDFs/B2016EN/3a.pdf  
19Banking Regulation, Global Legal Law, p. 118. (http://www.potamitisvekris.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/GLI-BR2_Greece.pdf). 
20Banking Regulation, Global Legal Law, p. 118. (http://www.potamitisvekris.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/GLI-BR2_Greece.pdf). 
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Literature Review 
So far the literature that examines the Greek banking system is limited and it usually focuses 
on the determinants of bank profitability, and their efficiency rather than on the 
determinants of their capital ratios.  
Capital adequacy ratio ensure that banks will have enough liquidity to absorb losses before 
they become insolvent, and that makes CAR critical. The more capital a bank has relative to 
the risks it takes, the more confident the stakeholders are that their interests are protected. 
Literature accepts various indices like non-performing loans, return on assets, return on 
equity, and bank size as determinants of capital ratio.  
The theoretical background for capital structure was introduced by Modigliani and Miller in 
1958.21 They argued that with perfect capital markets the total value of a firm should not 
depend on its capital structure.22 According to Miller there are fundamental differences in 
bank financing, although not important enough to overturn the M&M proposition.  
Berger and Herring (1995) examine why banks are required to maintain certain capital ratios 
imposed not only by the regulatory capital requirements but by the markets too. They 
define the market capital requirement as “…the capital that maximizes the value of the bank 
in the absence of regulatory capital requirements and all the regulatory mechanisms that 
are used to enforce them”.23 They use the term “safety net” to refer to all government 
actions designed to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking system other than the 
regulation and enforcement of capital requirements.24  
Bank’s market capital requirement motivates banks to hold additional capital in order to 
have extra capital during difficult times and at the same time to take advantage of profitable 
opportunities. In line with markets, regulators require banks to hold additional money for 
almost the same reasons. Beside the safety net, the regulatory safety net “protects the 
safety and soundness of banks and likely lowers bank capital”.25 
                                                          
21 F. Modigliani and M. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”, 
American Economic Review 48(3) (1958) pp. 261-297. 
22 Jonathan Berk, Peter DeManzo, Corporate Finance, Pearson International Edition, (2007) pp. 429-430. 
23 Berger, A. N., & Herring, R. J. (1995). The role of capital in ﬁnancial institutions. Working paper 95-01, p. 3. 
(http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/95/9501.pdf).  
24 See note 15, p. 11. 
25 See note 15, p. 52. 
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Daesik Kim and Anthony M. Santomero (1988) investigate the role of bank capital regulation 
in risk control. Regulators opt for more capital to less, because the amount of capital hold by 
banks ensures banks’ solvency, and consequently the solvency of the entire banking system. 
They support that “stringent capital regulation via a simple capital to asset ratio gives banks 
an incentive to increase their business risk by portfolio realignment”.26 The mean-variance 
model shows that with optimal risk weights the expected utility of banks will be lower than 
before. Also, banks have incentives to charge higher rates on assets due to different 
capitalization rates for different assets.27 
Hannan and Hanweck (1988), support that banks deal with insolvency problems when the 
current losses exhaust capital completely and when the return on assets is less than the 
negative capital-asset ratio. 
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff in their paper “From Financial Crush to Debt 
Crisis” (2011) examine the relationship between debt crisis and banking crisis. Notably, they 
try to answer the following questions: first, if the external debt surges are an antecedent to 
banking crisis. Second, if banking crises often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises. 
Third, if public borrowing surges ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have 
"hidden domestic debts" that exceed the better documented levels of external debt.28 
According to Eric A. Posner (2015) it is not clear how regulators determine how high or low 
the minimum capital adequacy ratio should be. It is revealed that regulators have never 
performed a serious economic analysis that would justify the levels that they have chosen. 
Regulators interest in capital adequacy because they want to prevent bank panics and 
contagions. It is expected that banks with high capital ratios will withstand better in an 
event of sudden loss, relative to a bank with low CAR. Posner says that most of the 
justifications about how the of capital levels were set, were “…terse, opaque, and laden with 
boilerplate language”.29 Regulators rarely did cost-benefit analysis, and when they did it was 
poorly performed. Finally, in 2011 it was prepared a high quality cost-benefit analysis that 
                                                          
26 Kim, D., & Santomero, A. M. (1988). Risk in banking and capital regulation. The Journal of Finance, 43, N0 5, 
(DECEMBER 1998) p. 1220. 
27 See note 18, p. 1230. 
28 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2011) From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis. The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 101 No. 5, pp. 1676-1706. 
29 Eric A. Posner (2015) How do bank regulators determine capital adequacy requirements? The University of 
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 82 No 4, pp. 1855. 
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was considered by many as a result of the financial crisis of 2007-08. It is questionable what 
would be happened if regulators had been required to use cost-benefit analysis before the 
turmoil of 2007. 
What is the optimal level of capital that the banks should maintain? Some academics claim 
that the capital should be as high as 50 percent. Their opinion is based on the Modigliani-
Miller theorem as it was analysed above. If the value of a firm does not depend on its mix of 
debt and equity there is no economic cost from forcing banks to hold equity. Generally, the 
view that high capital asset ratios would be socially beneficial prevails among scholars.  
At first regulators did not provide any adequate justification on how they set the minimum 
capital levels and why capital adequacy rules were appropriate to bank regulation. The 
results of a cost-benefit analysis revealed that the major benefit of capital adequacy 
regulations is that they reduce the probability of a financial crisis. According to academic 
literature a financial crisis occurs in a country once every 20-25 years and results in a 
median loss of 63 percent of Gross Domestic Product.30 
On the other hand, the major cost of capital adequacy regulations is the limitation of banks’ 
ability to choose the financial arrangements that maximize profits, banks cannot take on too 
much debt and must issue equity instead.  
Does capital adequacy ratio contribute to financial crisis? 
This question plagues scholars for many decades. It is questioned if the capital adequacy 
ratio promotes stability in economy or contributes to financial crisis. Banks with high debt 
and low level of capital relative to its assets, are more prone to failure in the event of a 
financial crisis. It is undeniable that banks with higher capital adequacy ratio are less risky 
and doing better during the crisis. Banks are important because a failure of a banks can 
trigger a financial crisis and affect adversely the global economy. 
When banks are forced to maintain a minimum amount of capital it makes them act in a less 
risky way because they have more to lose. A distressed bank meets one of the following 
conditions: 
a) Declared bankruptcy 
                                                          
30 Eric Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements? Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 698, 2014 p. 26. 
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b) Taken over by the government or put into government receivership 
c) Merged under duress with another bank 
d) Received a substantial government bailout 
It has been argued that higher levels of minimum capital requirements would prevent banks 
from failing, and somehow this is outlined in the new Basel III Accord. Although, many 
scholars support that the minimum capital adequacy ratio will not ensure the financial 
stability. Sticking point remains the process by which the level of minimum capital adequacy 
ratio is set. For example, in Basel I Accord the minimum capital adequacy ratio was set to 8 
percent and there has never been given any justification on how this quota was chosen. 
Regulators depend on state to provide them all the information and data they need and that 
makes capital adequacy ratio subject to political interference.  
After the Basel I Accord banks did hold capital above the minimum requirements. Similarly, 
before the financial crisis of 2007/08 banks’ capital ratios exceeded the minimum ratio set 
by regulators. Nevertheless, higher ratios did not protect them from failure and did not 
prevent the financial crisis. It is clear that higher capital levels do not guarantee higher 
prudence and lower risk-taking. The effectiveness of minimum capital requirements is 
further reduced by regulatory capital arbitrage - techniques that are used by banks in order 
to circumvent the minimum capital requirements rules. So, the risk can be even greater but 
the capital levels appear to comply with minimum requirements. 
It has been proved that higher minimum requirements reduce the future profits of banks, so 
it is not for their favour to hold more capital. That can make them invest in riskier assets in 
an effort to maximize their profits. Although, it can be argued that if banks were operating 
in unregulated marketplace they would have more incentives to check the riskiness of the 
assets they hold. 
Methodology-Data 
This study is interested in determining the factors that affect the capital adequacy ratio of 
Greek banks. In addition to the data of individual banks the paper uses a number of 
macroeconomic data drawn for the years 2001-2015 as well. The data set consists of an 
unbalanced panel data of four Greek commercial banks and covers the period from 2001 to 
2015 on a quarterly basis. The total number of observations is 240.  
17 
 
Fixed-Effects VS Random-Effects Model 
First, we have to choose between fixed-effect and random-effect model. Fixed-effects 
models are used when we are interested in analysing the impact of variables that vary over 
time. Fixed-effects explore the relationship between predictor and outcome variables within 
an entity (the banks in our case). When using fixed-effects we assume that something within 
the individual characteristics of the entity may impact or bias the predictor or outcome 
variables, something we need to check. Fixed-effect model removes the effect of time-
invariant characteristics so we can assess the net effect of the predictors on the outcome 
variable.31 
Another important assumption is that those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the 
individual and should not be correlated with other individual characteristics. One side effect 
of the features of fixed-effects models is that they cannot be used to investigate time-
invariant causes of the dependent variables. Fixed-effects models are designed to study the 
causes of changes within an entity.32 
The rationale behind the random effects model is that the variation across entities is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables 
included in the model. An advantage of random effect model is that you can include time-
invariant variables. Random effects assume that the entity’s error term is not correlated 
with the predictors which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory 
variables. In random effects model you need to specify those individual characteristics that 
may or may not influence the predictor variables.33 
In order to examine to what extent the capital adequacy ratio is influenced by the chosen 
internal and external factors the following regression is considered: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑈𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
                                                          
31 Data and statistical services, Panel data analysis, fixed and random effects using Stata, Princeton University, 
p. 9.  
32 Data and statistical services, Panel data analysis, fixed and random effects using Stata, Princeton University, 
p. 23. 
33 Data and statistical services, Panel data analysis, fixed and random effects using Stata, Princeton University, 
pp. 25-26. 
18 
 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is the capital ratio of four major Greek banks (NBG, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, 
Eurobank Ergasias) at time t; 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans of 
bank i at time t; 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the net interest margin of bank i at time t; 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the 
asset structure (total assets to loans) of bank i at time t;  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 is the country’s 
inflation at time t; 𝑈𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the country’s unemployment at time t; and 𝜀𝑡 is the 
error term. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, the CAR ratio, is a measure of a bank’s capital and is expressed as a 
percentage of a bank’s risk weighted exposures. It includes, tier I capital (shareholders’ 
equity and retained earnings) which is used to absorb losses without ceasing business 
operations, and tier II capital (revaluation reserves, hybrid capital instruments and 
subordinated term debt, general loan-loss reserves, and undisclosed reserves).34 This ratio is 
mandatory for banks and it is imposed by regulatory authorities to ensure that the bank has 
the ability to absorb a reasonable amount of losses. CAR is calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(%) =
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐼 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
∗ 100 
Chart 1 shows how the capital adequacy ratio of the major Greek banks changes during the 
period 2001 to 2015. The line with blue colour represents the National Bank of Greece. Until 
September 2006 the capital adequacy ratio increases steadily and reaches 26.6% after that 
it drops to 15.6% at the end of the same year. At the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, the 
capital adequacy ratio decreases considerably not only for the National Bank of Greece but 
for all four Greek banks. The orange line is for Piraeus Bank. In this case the fluctuation of 
capital adequacy ratio is more moderate. The higher value where was reached in March 
2013 (15.2%) and the lower in September 2011 (8.8%). The grey line stands for Alpha Bank. 
It can be observed that there is a sharp drop in December 2011 (4.6%) and March 2012 
(4.3%). These percentages are lower than the minimum capital level set by regulators. 
Finally, the yellow line represents the Eurobank Ergasias. In contrast with the previous banks 
it can be seen that Eurobank’s capital adequacy ratio remained relatively stable during the 
financial crisis of 2007-08.  
                                                          
34 http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/043015/what-difference-between-tier-1-capital-and-tier-2-
capital.asp  
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Chart 1. Capital Adequacy Ratio of Major Greek Banks. 
 
Independent variables 
Six explanatory variables are used as determinants of capital adequacy ratio: NPLs, ROE, Net 
Interest Margin, Asset Structure and two macroeconomic indicators, inflation and 
unemployment. The selection of these explanatory variables is based on prior studies and 
research.  
NPL: Non-performing loan is a loan on which the borrower is not making interest payments 
or repaying any principal. “A loan is non-performing when payments of interest and principal 
are past due by 90 days or more, or at least 90 days of interest payments have been 
capitalized, refinanced or delayed by agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, 
but there are good reasons to doubt that payments will be made in full”.35  NPLs reflect the 
quality of a bank’s loan portfolio and is accepted as a measurement of default risk.  
Loans constitute the main source of credit risk, which is associated with bank asset quality 
and plays an important role in bank failures. Non-performing loans is an indicator used very 
often as a measurement of banks’ loan portfolio quality. It is well known that the loan 
quality has greatly deteriorated in recent years, just after the outbreak of the financial crisis 
in Greece. Table 3 shows the percentage of banks non-performing loans to total gross loans 
                                                          
35 http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm  
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from 2001 to 2015. As we can see after 2008 the ratio of NPLs is constantly growing from 
4.67% in 2008 to 34.67% in 2015.  
Table 3. Non-performing loans of Greek banking sector, 2001-2015. 
Year Percentage of NPLs Year Percentage of NPLs Year Percentage of NPLs 
2015 34.67% 2010 9.12% 2005 6.3% 
2014 33.78% 2009 6.95% 2004 7% 
2013 33.9% 2008 4.67% 2003 7% 
2012 23.27% 2007 4.6% 2002 7.4% 
2011 14.43% 2006 5.4% 2001 5.6% 
 
Net Interest Margin: Net interest margin is measured as the difference between interest 
paid and interest received, divided by the total earning assets. The net interest margin 
measures the gap between what the bank pays savers and what the bank receives from 
borrowers. It is an indicator of operational efficiency of the bank and the competiveness of 
the banking market.36 Studies suggest that there is a positive relationship between net 
interest margin and bank capital.  
Chart 2, shows the net interest margin of the four major Greek banks. The blue graph shows 
the net interest margin for the National Bank of Greece, the orange for the Piraeus Bank, 
the grey stands for Alpha Bank and the yellow for Eurobank Ergasias. As we can see 
Eurobank Ergasias has the higher net interest margin among the four banks and then 
follows National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and Piraeus Bank.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Luc Laeven and Ross Levine, Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of 
Financial Intermediation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, (Jun., 2004), pp. 594-595. 
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Chart 2. Net Interest Margin of the four Major Greek Banks 
 
Asset structure: asset structure represents the share of loans in total assets and indicates 
the level assets’ risk, since the lending of funds is always connected with some level of 
uncertainty related to the borrower. The larger the share of loans, the lesser the share of 
tangible assets which provide the creditors with a guarantee that the money they lend will 
be repaid. This makes more difficult the financing with debt and affects the capital 
proportion by increasing the share of equity in total liabilities.  
Chart 3 presents the asset structure of the four major Greek banks. The blue graph shows 
the asset structure of National Bank of Greece, the orange shows the asset structure of 
Piraeus Bank, the grey shows the asset structure of Alpha Bank and the yellow graph shows 
the asset structure of Eurobank Ergasias. As we can see National Bank of Greece has the 
lower share of loans in total assets, especially until 2008. Then follows Eurobank Ergasias, 
Piraeus Bank and Alpha Bank, which has extremely good performance after 2006, even 
during the financial crisis of 2007-08. 
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Chart 3. Asset Structure of the Four Major Greek Banks 
 
 
Inflation: inflation is the rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is 
rising and, consequently, the purchasing power of currency is falling. Typically, is expressed 
as an annual percentage. Inflations is important for banks because they typically deal in 
nominal financial instruments, and the payments of these instruments are fixed in nominal 
value. These instruments make up an important size of a bank’s assets and liabilities.37  
Chart 4 shows the inflation in Greece for the period 2001-2015. Since 2001 inflation has 
decreased from 4.5% in 2001 to 2.2% at the end of 2008. In 2009, inflation reached 0.7% 
and from 2013 inflation is negative, with lower price at -2.5% in December 2014. In 
December 2015 inflation was positive at 0.4%. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/03/Effects_Mar1986.pdf?ref=HadiZayifla.Com p. 15 
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Chart 4. Inflation in Greece for the period 2001-2015. 
 
Unemployment: Unemployment is a phenomenon that occurs when a person who is actively 
searching for employment is unable to find work.38 High unemployment is associated with 
lower levels of economic activity which has negative impact on banks. The risk that the 
borrower will default on their loans increase and the money supply of the bank reduces.   
Chart 5 shows the unemployment rate in Greece during the period 2001 to 2015. Generally, 
unemployment in Greece was about 9%-10%, the lower value was in September 2008 
(7.2%). After the financial crisis of 2008 unemployment in Greece has reached very high 
unemployment rates such as 27.9% in September 2013. Since then unemployment has 
decreased slowly to 24.4% in December 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unemployment.asp  
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Chart 5. Unemployment Rate in Greece for the period 2001-2015. 
 
Some difficulties related to this study include the availability and reliability of the data. It is 
worth to mention that banks’ data in some circumstances differ from official data of other 
sources. Also, data for the period before 2006 are not available for all banks or may be not 
included in every financial statement. Consequently, we have to assume that Greek banks’ 
data are unreliable to some extent.  
Possible methodological limitations include the sample size. This study uses the four major 
Greek banks (NBG, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank and Eurobank Ergasias), while the total 
number of credit institutions incorporated in Greece for 2015 is 17.39 For that reason 
quarterly data were used for the period 2001-2015 and not annually.  
Data analysis 
The data came from Bankscope database, ThomsonOne database and the banks’ annual and 
quarterly reports. The test includes the four largest Greek banks, and 280 observations, with 
total assets 371.921 billion or almost 90 percent of the Greek banking system. The financial 
data were generated using the Stata tools. The data are quarterly and cover the period from 
2001 to 2015.  
                                                          
39  "List of credit institutions authorized in Greece" 
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In order to decide between fixed and random effects we can run a Hausman test on Stata, 
where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative 
the fixed effects. In tables 4, 6 you can see the results of fixed-effects model and random 
effects model respectively. 
 Table 4. Fixed Effects Model 
R-sq 0.1614  
F(6, 230) 7.38 
Prob > F 0.0000 
 
CAR Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
ROE   -0.0000564 0.0000358 -1.58 0.116 -0.0001269 0.0000141 
Net Interest 
Margin 
0.1564495 0.1619999 0.97 0.335 -0.162744 0.4756429 
Asset Structure -0.0002292 0.0003061 -0.75 0.455 -0.0008324 0.0003739 
NPLs 0.3010309 0.0494758 6.08 0.000 0.2035471 0.3985147 
Unemployment -0.366704 0.0618479 -5.93 0.000 -0.4886412 -
0.2449196 
Inflation 0.1647624 0.1388176 1.19 0.236 -0.1087543 0.4382791 
_cons 0.1308028 0.0075363 17.36 0.000 0.1159537 0.1456519 
 
F test F (3, 230) = 2.65 Prob > F =0.0494 
 
On table 5 you can see the Hausman test results. The Prob>chi2=0.9969, this is more than 
0.05 (i.e not significant) so we use random effects model. 
Table 5. Hausman test 
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
Sqrt (diag (V_b-V_B)) 
S.E. 
ROE -0.0000541 -0.0000452 -8.89e-06  
Net Interest 
Margin 
0.0559636 0.0180631 0.0379005 0.1061899 
Asset Structure -0.0398027 -0.0335847 -0.0062181 0.012351 
NPLs 0.2681107 0.2698885 -0.0017779 0.0075393 
Unemployment -0.3259533 -0.3262442 0.0002909 0.0106086 
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Inflation 0.1174593 0.1252491 -0.0077898  
 
Prob>chi2 0.9969 
 
Table 6 exhibits the results of the regression. P-value is the probability of obtaining an effect 
at least as extreme as the one in our sample data. Two-tail p-values test the hypothesis that 
each coefficient is different from zero. To reject this, the p-value has to be lower than 0.05 
(for 95% confidence interval). If this is the case, then the variable has a significant influence 
on the dependent variable. As we can see from table 1, the Wald chi2 is 49.92 and the 
probability value is zero. It means that all the coefficients of this model are different from 
zero and the model is nicely fitted. 
From the same table we can see the p-values for all the coefficients. It can be seen that the 
return on equity (ROE) has a p-value of 0.205 or 20.5% that is greater than a=0.05, and the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. It means that ROE is not a significant variable to explain the 
capital adequacy ratio of Greek banks, that is it does not directly affect the level of banks’ 
capital. The insignificance of return on equity is consistent with other studies about banks’ 
capital adequacy. Emilia Klepczarek, Determinant of European Banks’ Capital Adequacy, 
finds a ROE with a low value, so it is not analysed.  
Table 6. Random-Effect Model 
R-sq 0.1729  
Wald chi2 (5) 49.92 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
CAR Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
ROE   -0.0000452 0.0000357 -1.27 0.205 -0.0001152 0.0000247 
Net Interest 
Margin 
0.0180631 0.1310147 0.14 0.890 -0.2787209 0.2748472 
Asset Structure -0.0335847 0.0156074 -2.15 0.031 -0.0641746 -
0.0029948 
NPLs 0.2698885 0.0511829 5.27 0.000 0.1695719 0.3702052 
Unemployment -0.3262442 0.0638598 -5.11 0.000 -0.4514071 -
0.2010812 
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Inflation 0.1252491 0.1399626 0.89 0.371 -0.1490725 0.3995707 
_cons 0.1538216 0.0130881 11.75 0.000 0.1281694 0.1794739 
 
 
Net interest margin has a positive sign which is consistent with the past empirical findings, 
that high earnings provides banks managers easy access to equity capital and self-regulatory 
incentives to minimize the taking risk. Although, NIM has a p-value 0.890 that is higher than 
a=0.05, so the net interest margin is insignificant variable, that is it does not directly affect 
the level of Greek bank’s capital adequacy.  
The regression result shows that there is a negative relationship between loans/total assets 
and the capital adequacy ratio. The p-value is 0.031, lower than a=0.05 and that means that 
the asset structure variable is significant and affect directly the level of capital adequacy 
ratio of Greek banks. That is, if the asset structure ratio increases by 1% the capital level is 
expected to decrease by 0.3262 on average, holding other variables constant. 
Non-performing loans is an important indicator of banks’ healthy solvency ratio. High NPLs 
ratio signifies a riskier bank. The empirical result indicates the significantly positive 
correlation between capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loans. Particularly the p-
value=0.00 which is remarkably smaller than a=0.05 indicates that the NPLs variable affects 
directly the level of capital adequacy ratio of banks. In other words, since the NPLs ratio 
grows by 1% the capital level is expected to increase by 0.27% on average, holding other 
variables constant. 
The statistical analysis reveals the significant negative relationship between capital 
adequacy ratio and unemployment. Particularly, the p-value is zero which is smaller than 
a=0.05. It means that the unemployment affects directly the level of capital adequacy ratio 
of Greek banks. When unemployment drops 1% the banks’ capital level will experience an 
increase by 0.3262 on average.  
Finally, the regression result show that there is a positive relationship between inflation and 
the level of capital adequacy ratio. But, as we can see the p-value is 0.233, higher than 
a=0.05, which consequently means that the unemployment variable is insignificant and does 
not affect directly the capital adequacy ratio of Greek banks. 
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R-square shows the amount of variance of dependent variable explained by independent 
variables. In our case the R-square is 17,29 percent. Adjusted R-square shows the same as R-
square but adjusted by the number of cases and number of variables. When the number of 
variables is small and the number of cases is very large then adjusted R-square is closer to R-
square.  
Table 7 shows the results of the summary statistics. The number of observations is 240 for 
all variables. The mean is the average of the data and it is used as a standard measure of the 
centre of the distribution of the data. The mean is greatly affected by unusual values 
(outliers). As we can see the mean for our variables lies between 0.0110221 and 0.1483667. 
Return on Equity is an exception as it has a negative value of -2.810978, which is justified by 
the unusual negative values for some quarters for all banks.  
Standard deviation shows how spread out the data are about the mean. A high value 
indicates greater spread in the data, correspondingly a low value indicates lower spread in 
the data. As we can see ROE has an extremely high standard deviation. But as we have 
mention before this is due to the existence of outliers in the data. Another variable with 
high standard deviation is the ratio of loans in total assets, followed by unemployment, 
inflation, net interest margin, NPLs, and capital adequacy ratio.  
On the same table we can see the minimum and maximum values. Minimum is the smallest 
data value while maximum is the largest data value. Again, return on equity has remarkably 
low minimum value (-616.5357) and it is explained by the presents of outliers in the data.  
Table 7. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAR 240 0.1201929 0.0232934 0.043 0.2663 
ROE 240 -2.810978 39.92346 -616.5357 16.4 
Net Interest 
Margin 
240 0.0110221 0.114363 -0.0031 0.0891 
Asset Structure 240 0.9743746 4.57185 0.395 71.49 
NPLs 240 0.1273617 0.1051853 0.046 0.345 
Unemployment 240 0.1483667 0.722112 0.074 0.279 
Inflation 240 0.0231167 0.206441 -0.025 0.057 
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Table 8 presents the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. So, the Breusch-Pagan test 
produces a chi2 test statistic with 6 degrees of freedom when the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity is satisfied. That test statistic in this particular case is 9.29 and the p-
value is 15.77% so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity.  
Table 8. Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroscedasticity. 
chi2 (6) 9.29 
Prob > chi2 0.1577 
 
Table 9 is a correlation matrix that lists the variable names down the first column and across 
the first row. The value of 1 in absolute terms, means that there is a perfect positive or 
negative correlation between two variables. The diagonal of a correlation matrix always 
consists of ones, because there are the correlations between each variable and itself. The 
absolute value between 0.80-0.99 indicates a strong relationship between the variables, a 
value between 0.5-0.79 indicates moderate relationship, 0.3-0.49 indicates weak 
relationship between two variables and 0-0.29 indicates possible relationship between the 
variables.  
As we can see from table 9 probably there is no connection between the variables. Only 
between unemployment and non-performing loans there is a strong positive relationship, 
meaning that 94.7 percent of variance in non-performing loans is explained by variance in 
unemployment. Also, there is a strong negative relationship between non-performing loans 
and inflation (-87.37%) and between unemployment and inflation (-81.78%). 
Table 9. Correlation Matrix 
 CAR ROE NIM ASS.STRUCT NPLs UNEMPL INFLAT 
CAR 1.0000       
ROE -0.0146 1.0000      
NIM 0.0224 0.0458 1.0000     
ASSET. 
STRUCT 
-0.0661 0.0036 -0.0464 1.0000    
NPLs 0.1650 -0.0464 0.0540 -0.0299 1.0000   
UNEMPL 0.0491 -0.1056 0.0884 -0.0272 0.9470 1.0000  
INFLAT -0.1207 0.0495 -0.0258 0.0483 -0.9737 -0.8178 1.0000 
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Subsample analysis: the impact of the financial crisis 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 has changed the world’s financial landscape. It has been set 
clear that the risks were mispriced, the regulatory frameworks for financial institutions did 
not work as expected and people’s awareness of what is a banking crisis and the 
implications on the economy increased. In this thesis we have created a subsample analysis 
to include the impact of financial crisis, in order to conclude whether the results are 
affected by the or not by the current financial crisis.  
In order to examine the impact of the financial crisis on capital adequacy ratio of Greek 
banks, we use as reference point the level of the Athens Stock Exchange General Index. We 
have used the historical prices of the index with quarterly frequency for the period 2001 to 
2015. The prices are divided into two groups. The first group includes data from 2001 to 
2007 (that is just before the financial crisis) and the second group includes data after the 
financial crisis of 2008.  
The following regression is being considered: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑈𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is the capital ratio of four major Greek banks (NBG, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, 
Eurobank Ergasias) at time t; 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans of 
bank i at time t; 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the net interest margin of bank i at time t; 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the 
asset structure (total assets to loans) of bank i at time t;  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 is the country’s 
inflation at time t; 𝑈𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 is the country’s unemployment at time t;  Fincrisis is a 
binary (dummy) variable that indicates the absence or existence of financial crisis;  and 𝜀𝑡 is 
the error term. 
It is assumed that the pre financial crisis price index represents a healthy financial sector, 
without disruptions in the economy. After 2008 the price level of the general index gradually 
decreased and incorporated the impact of the financial crisis. So, we assume that the price 
level of the Athens Stock Exchange General Index is directly connected with the financial 
crisis. The existence of the financial disruption is displayed by the price index of the Athens 
Stock Exchange General. The average price of the index before the crisis is used as an 
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indicator of economic growth and development, and the average price of the index after 
2008 depicts the impact of the crisis.  
Table 10, shows the results of the new regression. In this regression we have added the 
impact of the financial crisis on the capital adequacy ratio. Financial crisis is illustrated with 
a binary (dummy) variable. The binary variable takes the value 0 or1 to indicate the absence 
or the presence of financial crisis. When the price of the Athens Stock Exchange General 
Index is higher than the average index price before the year 2007 there is no financial crisis, 
If the price of the Athens Stock Exchange General Index is lower than the average index 
price before the year 2007 then it indicates the existence of a crisis.  
As we can see the R squared is 18.38% higher than in the previous regression (17,29%). As 
we said before p-value test the hypothesis that each coefficient is different from zero. ROE 
has a p-value 0.211 which is higher than 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis and accept 
that the variable has not influence on the dependent variable. Net Interest Margin has p-
value of 0.737, that is, it has no impact on the capital adequacy ratio.  
Asset structure has a p-value of 0.020 which is lower than 0.05, and we can say state that 
the variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable. Non-performing loans 
and inflation have a p-value equal to zero, exactly as in the previous regression. P-value is 
lower than 0.05, so the variables are significant and have influence on capital adequacy ratio 
of Greek banks. In other words, since the assets structure ratio grows by 1% the capital level 
is expected to decrease by 0.0365 on average, holding other variables constant. 
Table 10. Random Effects Model 
R-sq 0.1838  
Wald chi2 (5) 50.24 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
CAR Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
ROE   -0.0000444 0.0000355 -1.25 0.211 -0.0001141 0.0000252 
Net Interest 
Margin 
0.0440989 0.1314944 0.34 0.737 -0.2136253 0.3018231 
Asset Structure -0.0365592 0.0156554 -2.34 0.020 -0.0672432 -
0.0058752 
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NPLs 0.2604469 0.0513188 5.08 0.000 0.159864 0.3610299 
Unemployment -0.2970865 0.0660512 -4.50 0.000 -0.4265445 -
0.1676285 
Inflation 0.1183413 0.1395166 0.85 0.396 -0.1551061 0.3917888 
Fincrisis -0.0060235 0.0036625 -1.64 0.100 -0.0011548 0.0132017 
_cons 0.150988 0.0131538 11.48 0.000 0.125207 0.1767691 
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
Banks are required by legislation to maintain minimum capital level. As a result of 2007 
financial crisis banks are required to hold higher levels of higher quality capital in order to 
reduce the probability of bankruptcy.  
In this thesis we have examined the determinants of capital adequacy ratio in Greece using 
quarterly data for the period 2001 to 2015. We have set the capital adequacy ratio as the 
dependent variable and other six variables as independent variables, namely, return on 
equity, net interest margin, asset structure (loans/total assets), non-performing loans and 
two macroeconomic indicators, unemployment and inflation. Two variables, non-
performing loans and unemployment, have been found statistically significant to explain the 
capital adequacy ratio. Non-performing loans have a positive association with capital 
adequacy ratio while unemployment has negative. 
Greek banks operate in a country with severe economic difficulties that cannot affect its 
profitability and solvency. Until today Greece continues to face significant and essential 
challenges such as high unemployment rate, which reached at levels that the country had 
never experienced after entry in the European Union, low or negative growth rate that can 
be reversed by creating jobs and by shifting the economy from consumption to exports and 
investment. 
Further research could include more banks and variables, such as share of deposits, GDP 
growth rate, and total equity to total liabilities.   
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Appendix 
Bank 
Name 
Year CAR ROE Net 
Interest 
Margin 
Asset 
Structure 
NPLs Unemp
loymen
t 
Inflation FTSE/ATHE
X Large 
Cap 
unit_i
d 
NBG 31/12/2015 14,6% -55,15% -0,31% 45,39% 34,35% 24,40% 0,40% 1883,50 1 
NBG 30/9/2015 9,6% -44,77% 0,53% 63,41% 34,50% 24,70% -0,80% 1822,60 1 
NBG 30/6/2015 9,5% -36,58% 0,52% 64,41% 34,40% 25,10% -1,10% 2495,20 1 
NBG 31/3/2015 12,1% -3,89% 0,52% 63,49% 34,00% 25,80% -1,90% 2564,50 1 
NBG 31/12/2014 13,6% 0,94% 0,57% 64,10% 33,77% 25,90% -2,50% 3118,80 1 
NBG 30/9/2014 15,9% 23,37% 0,56% 65,15% 33,40% 26,20% -1,10% 3771,20 1 
NBG 30/6/2014 16,3% 21,27% 0,54% 65,45% 32,90% 27,00% -1,50% 3979,90 1 
NBG 31/3/2014 10,5% 90,11% 0,52% 64,42% 32,50% 27,10% -1,50% 4175,50 1 
NBG 31/12/2013 11,2% 49,76% 0,54% 64,59% 31,90% 27,50% -1,80% 3958,50 1 
NBG 30/9/2013 9,2% 152,67% 0,54% 65,31% 29,30% 27,90% -1,00% 3082,10 1 
NBG 30/6/2013 9,2% 20,83% 0,60% 65,46% 28,10% 27,80% -0,20% 3457,60 1 
NBG 31/3/2013 9,5% 20,83% 0,58% 71,05% 26,70% 27,10% -0,20% 3352,40 1 
NBG 31/12/2012 9,2% 20,83% 2,16% 70,79% 23,30% 26,40% 0,30% 2800,00 1 
NBG 30/9/2012 9,2% -845,49% 2,16% 71,10% 21,40% 26,10% 0,30% 2341,00 1 
NBG 30/6/2012 9,3% -634,13% 2,16% 72,03% 18,90% 24,90% 1,00% 1893,10 1 
NBG 31/3/2012 8,1% -404,06% 2,16% 71,50% 16,50% 22,60% 1,30% 3044,50 1 
NBG 31/12/2011 11,3% -382,31% 0,66% 71,80% 14,40% 21,30% 2,20% 2691,60 1 
NBG 30/9/2011 12,2% -15,48% 0,62% 67,97% 13,30% 19,10% 2,90% 3829,20 1 
NBG 30/6/2011 10,8% -13,02% 0,65% 68,00% 12,10% 17,30% 3,10% 5866,40 1 
NBG 31/3/2011 9,9% 6,96% 0,65% 67,35% 10,20% 16,00% 4,30% 7380,30 1 
NBG 31/12/2010 13,7% 5,34% 0,65% 66,96% 9,10% 14,70% 5,20% 6703,20 1 
NBG 30/9/2010 13,1% 2,58% 0,64% 68,30% 8,90% 13,40% 5,70% 7574,50 1 
NBG 30/6/2010 13,1% 5,02% 0,65% 67,94% 8,20% 12,50% 5,20% 7447,50 1 
NBG 31/3/2010 11,1% 9,36% 0,67% 70,03% 7,80% 11,60% 3,90% 9550,70 1 
NBG 31/12/2009 11,3% 13,88% 0,69% 68,83% 7,00% 10,70% 2,50% 11842,10 1 
NBG 30/9/2009 12,2% 17,83% 0,67% 71,59% 6,60% 9,90% 0,70% 13048,40 1 
NBG 30/6/2009 10,5% 20,81% 0,67% 69,17% 5,50% 9,40% 0,70% 12203,10 1 
NBG 31/3/2009 10,5% 24,72% 0,68% 72,50% 5,00% 9,10% 1,50% 7551,30 1 
NBG 31/12/2008 10,3% 25,66% 0,71% 74,12% 4,70% 8,60% 2,20% 9904,80 1 
NBG 30/9/2008 10,9% 23,08% 0,71% 66,45% 4,60% 7,60% 4,70% 18005,70 1 
NBG 30/6/2008 10,7% 25,74% 0,74% 66,52% 4,70% 7,40% 4,90% 22104,00 1 
NBG 31/3/2008 9,7% 27,87% 0,74% 65,89% 4,60% 8,20% 4,40% 21115,40 1 
NBG 31/12/2007 9,2% 24,88% 0,72% 63,23% 4,60% 8,30% 3,90% 27087,70 1 
NBG 30/9/2007 17,1% 23,43% 0,72% 62,32% 4,70% 8,90% 3,00% 26367,50 1 
NBG 30/6/2007 10,6% 29,08% 0,72% 63,42% 4,80% 8,90% 2,60% 26666,50 1 
NBG 31/3/2007 10,6% 24,81% 0,71% 62,62% 5,10% 9,00% 2,80% 24409,90 1 
NBG 31/12/2006 15,6% 20,37% 0,71% 58,98% 5,40% 8,60% 3,20% 23176,10 1 
NBG 30/9/2006 26,6% 22,93% 0,63% 61,25% 5,50% 8,90% 3,10% 21125,50 1 
NBG 30/6/2006 16,4% 34,40% 0,60% 58,86% 5,90% 9,30% 3,40% 19996,90 1 
NBG 31/3/2006 16,4% 28,58% 0,56% 57,10% 6,00% 9,50% 3,30% 23387,80 1 
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NBG 31/12/2005 15,2% 26,55% 0,49% 51,68% 6,20% 9,70% 3,50% 19138,40 1 
NBG 30/9/2005 16,8% 22,54% 0,49% 50,03% 6,30% 10,10% 3,80% 18147,70 1 
NBG 30/6/2005 14,9% 17,96% 0,49% 49,95% 6,50% 10,00% 3,20% 16569,40 1 
NBG 31/3/2005 14,9% 14,20% 0,49% 48,50% 6,80% 10,30% 2,80% 17555,50 1 
NBG 31/12/2004 14,8% 16,51% 3,00% 47,81% 7,00% 10,30% 3,10% 14549,80 1 
NBG 30/9/2004 15,6% 18,43% 3,00% 45,02% 6,90% 10,40% 2,90% 12413,60 1 
NBG 30/6/2004 13,3% 16,92% 3,00% 45,38% 7,00% 10,80% 3,00% 12818,40 1 
NBG 31/3/2004 13,3% 16,39% 3,00% 44,20% 6,90% 11,10% 2,90% 12755,30 1 
NBG 31/12/2003 12,9% 9,70% 0,48% 43,04% 7,00% 9,90% 3,10% 11002,00 1 
NBG 30/9/2003 12,9% 9,70% 0,45% 43,65% 7,10% 9,70% 3,30% 11210,10 1 
NBG 30/6/2003 12,9% 9,70% 0,45% 40,50% 7,15% 9,70% 3,70% 8541,40 1 
NBG 31/3/2003 12,9% 9,70% 0,45% 40,98% 7,20% 9,80% 3,90% 7871,70 1 
NBG 31/12/2002 10,4% 9,78% 2,60% 41,25% 7,20% 10,00% 3,50% 9146,10 1 
NBG 30/9/2002 12,6% 9,78% 2,60% 42,50% 6,90% 10,20% 3,80% 10827,80 1 
NBG 30/6/2002 12,6% 9,78% 2,60% 40,70% 6,30% 10,30% 3,60% 12179,60 1 
NBG 31/3/2002 12,6% 9,78% 2,60% 40,30% 5,80% 10,70% 4,30% 12640,40 1 
NBG 31/12/2001 10,2% 15,04% 2,40% 40,65% 5,60% 10,80% 3,50% 14685,80 1 
NBG 30/9/2001 11,3% 15,04% 2,40% 39,50% 5,40% 10,70% 4,00% 15449,20 1 
NBG 30/6/2001 11,7% 15,04% 2,40% 40,41% 5,30% 10,50% 4,50% 18207,90 1 
NBG 31/3/2001 11,7% 15,04% 2,40% 39,56% 5,00% 10,50% 3,20% 17879,80 1 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2015 17,8% -25,1% 0,41% 61,58% 34,35% 24,40% 0,40% 1883,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2015 11,3% 31,7% 0,45% 64,26% 34,50% 24,70% -0,80% 1822,60 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2015 10,2% -39,9% 0,45% 64,30% 34,40% 25,10% -1,10% 2495,20 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2015 12,0% -24,7% 0,45% 66,13% 34,00% 25,80% -1,90% 2564,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2014 12,5% -26,4% 0,45% 67,36% 33,77% 25,90% -2,50% 3118,80 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2014 13,6% -27,8% 0,44% 68,09% 33,40% 26,20% -1,10% 3771,20 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2014 15,0% -11,3% 0,44% 69,02% 32,90% 27,00% -1,50% 3979,90 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2014 14,5% -30,5% 0,41% 69,12% 32,50% 27,10% -1,50% 4175,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2013 14,0% 98,1% 0,39% 69,96% 31,90% 27,50% -1,80% 3958,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2013 13,6% 108,6% 0,38% 69,87% 29,30% 27,90% -1,00% 3082,10 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2013 14,0% 103,1% 0,35% 69,49% 28,10% 27,80% -0,20% 3457,60 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2013 15,2% 84,3% 0,31% 73,69% 26,70% 27,10% -0,20% 3352,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2012 12,2% -93,7% 0,30% 75,06% 23,30% 26,40% 0,30% 2800,00 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2012 13,0% -194,8% 0,32% 76,85% 21,40% 26,10% 0,30% 2341,00 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2012 13,0% -
61653,6
% 
0,35% 74,23% 18,90% 24,90% 1,00% 1893,10 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2012 9,0% -696,3% 0,35% 73,59% 16,50% 22,60% 1,30% 3044,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2011 9,7% -4298,5% 0,39% 72,50% 14,40% 21,30% 2,20% 2691,60 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2011 8,8% -45,8% 0,43% 65,22% 13,30% 19,10% 2,90% 3829,20 2 
Piraeus 30/6/2011 9,5% -30,2% 0,41% 67,45% 12,10% 17,30% 3,10% 5866,40 2 
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Bank 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2011 11,6% -0,8% 0,41% 68,20% 10,20% 16,00% 4,30% 7380,30 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2010 11,2% -0,7% 0,40% 69,08% 9,10% 14,70% 5,20% 6703,20 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2010 9,7% -0,1% 0,41% 70,60% 8,90% 13,40% 5,70% 7574,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2010 9,7% 2,8% 0,40% 71,86% 8,20% 12,50% 5,20% 7447,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2010 9,8% 5,3% 0,40% 71,49% 7,80% 11,60% 3,90% 9550,70 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2009 9,8% 7,9% 0,42% 72,14% 7,00% 10,70% 2,50% 11842,10 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2009 10,3% 9,5% 0,42% 73,64% 6,60% 9,90% 0,70% 13048,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2009 11,2% 8,6% 0,41% 71,30% 5,50% 9,40% 0,70% 12203,10 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2009 10,0% 7,6% 0,36% 74,04% 5,00% 9,10% 1,50% 7551,30 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2008 9,9% 11,0% 0,43% 74,74% 4,70% 8,60% 2,20% 9904,80 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2008 10,0% 18,8% 0,45% 76,95% 4,60% 7,60% 4,70% 18005,70 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2008 10,5% 18,3% 0,46% 73,27% 4,70% 7,40% 4,90% 22104,00 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2008 10,8% 18,0% 0,43% 76,09% 4,60% 8,20% 4,40% 21115,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2007 12,2% 29,5% 0,48% 71,63% 4,60% 8,30% 3,90% 27087,70 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2007 10,0% 18,8% 0,45% 80,40% 4,70% 8,90% 3,00% 26367,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2007 9,8% 36,0% 0,46% 74,63% 4,80% 8,90% 2,60% 26666,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2007 11,1% 32,2% 0,41% 88,68% 5,10% 9,00% 2,80% 24409,90 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2006 11,3% 29,0% 0,57% 75,31% 5,40% 8,60% 3,20% 23176,10 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2006 11,5% 29,9% 0,50% 80,61% 5,50% 8,90% 3,10% 21125,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2006 10,3% 21,8% 0,53% 73,30% 5,90% 9,30% 3,40% 19996,90 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2006 11,3% 26,4% 0,48% 81,89% 6,00% 9,50% 3,30% 23387,80 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2005 11,0% 21,0% -0,16% 75,34% 6,20% 9,70% 3,50% 19138,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2005 11,1% 19,5% 0,89% 71,25% 6,30% 10,10% 3,80% 18147,70 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2005 10,7% 19,3% 0,89% 74,99% 6,50% 10,00% 3,20% 16569,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2005 12,1% 18,8% 0,90% 72,27% 6,80% 10,30% 2,80% 17555,50 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2004 13,4% 14,4% 0,88% 73,62% 7,00% 10,30% 3,10% 14549,80 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2004 12,0% 14,9% 0,89% 72,50% 6,90% 10,40% 2,90% 12413,60 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2004 9,7% 15,9% 0,88% 76,30% 7,00% 10,80% 3,00% 12818,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2004 10,0% 13,9% 0,46% 74,65% 6,90% 11,10% 2,90% 12755,30 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2003 11,2% 12,5% 0,45% 72,59% 7,00% 9,90% 3,10% 11002,00 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2003 10,5% 13,9% 0,43% 70,60% 7,10% 9,70% 3,30% 11210,10 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2003 11,1% 12,5% 0,44% 71,65% 7,15% 9,70% 3,70% 8541,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2003 10,8% 13,0% 0,44% 72,98% 7,20% 9,80% 3,90% 7871,70 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2002 11,0% 11,1% 0,43% 67,30% 7,20% 10,00% 3,50% 9146,10 2 
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Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2002 11,9% 12,0% 0,41% 66,50% 6,90% 10,20% 3,80% 10827,80 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2002 12,0% 11,1% 0,44% 62,30% 6,30% 10,30% 3,60% 12179,60 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2002 10,6% 14,1% 0,41% 63,80% 5,80% 10,70% 4,30% 12640,40 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/12/2001 11,9% 14,5% 0,42% 62,30% 5,60% 10,80% 3,50% 14685,80 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/9/2001 11,9% 14,8% 0,40% 61,30% 5,40% 10,70% 4,00% 15449,20 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
30/6/2001 12,6% 15,3% 0,39% 61,80% 5,30% 10,50% 4,50% 18207,90 2 
Piraeus 
Bank 
31/3/2001 10,0% 15,9% 0,40% 60,90% 5,00% 10,50% 3,20% 17879,80 2 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2015 16,8% -16,5% 0,55% 74,21% 34,35% 24,40% 0,40% 1883,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2015 12,6% -16,8% 0,54% 74,71% 34,50% 24,70% -0,80% 1822,60 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2015 14,4% -24,6% 0,53% 75,14% 34,40% 25,10% -1,10% 2495,20 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2015 13,3% -4,4% 0,63% 75,62% 34,00% 25,80% -1,90% 2564,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2014 14,7% -4,4% 0,52% 75,57% 33,77% 25,90% -2,50% 3118,80 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2014 15,8% 7,3% 0,52% 76,68% 33,40% 26,20% -1,10% 3771,20 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2014 16,6% 15,6% 0,50% 77,38% 32,90% 27,00% -1,50% 3979,90 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2014 14,6% -12,6% 0,60% 76,06% 32,50% 27,10% -1,50% 4175,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2013 16,4% 83,0% 0,49% 76,50% 31,90% 27,50% -1,80% 3958,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2013 13,9% 63,2% 0,44% 77,54% 29,30% 27,90% -1,00% 3082,10 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2013 14,2% 61,1% 0,42% 77,64% 28,10% 27,80% -0,20% 3457,60 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2013 11,7% 144,1% 0,40% 82,91% 26,70% 27,10% -0,20% 3352,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2012 9,1% -1444,5% 0,38% 77,58% 23,30% 26,40% 0,30% 2800,00 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2012 9,7% -226,3% 0,61% 78,90% 21,40% 26,10% 0,30% 2341,00 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2012 10,3% -203,8% 0,67% 79,50% 18,90% 24,90% 1,00% 1893,10 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2012 4,3% -139,1% 0,59% 80,36% 16,50% 22,60% 1,30% 3044,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2011 4,6% -160,5% 0,56% 80,93% 14,40% 21,30% 2,20% 2691,60 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2011 12,5% -14,0% 0,52% 79,14% 13,30% 19,10% 2,90% 3829,20 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2011 12,3% -11,9% 0,49% 79,24% 12,10% 17,30% 3,10% 5866,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2011 13,4% 2,2% 0,50% 78,98% 10,20% 16,00% 4,30% 7380,30 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2010 13,5% 2,0% 0,50% 77,36% 9,10% 14,70% 5,20% 6703,20 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2010 13,1% 2,1% 0,48% 81,25% 8,90% 13,40% 5,70% 7574,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2010 13,1% 4,6% 0,49% 82,03% 8,20% 12,50% 5,20% 7447,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2010 12,8% 6,9% 0,48% 80,48% 7,80% 11,60% 3,90% 9550,70 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2009 13,2% 9,4% 0,47% 80,90% 7,00% 10,70% 2,50% 11842,10 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2009 11,6% 8,5% 0,49% 81,36% 6,60% 9,90% 0,70% 13048,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2009 11,2% 9,5% 0,45% 77,56% 5,50% 9,40% 0,70% 12203,10 3 
Alpha 31/3/2009 8,7% 12,4% 0,44% 78,33% 5,00% 9,10% 1,50% 7551,30 3 
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Bank 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2008 9,8% 16,0% 0,50% 81,63% 4,70% 8,60% 2,20% 9904,80 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2008 12,8% 23,2% 0,56% 81,35% 4,60% 7,60% 4,70% 18005,70 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2008 12,8% 26,2% 0,59% 84,69% 4,70% 7,40% 4,90% 22104,00 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2008 13,6% 25,3% 0,58% 86,00% 4,60% 8,20% 4,40% 21115,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2007 13,3% 27,8% 0,61% 83,53% 4,60% 8,30% 3,90% 27087,70 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2007 12,2% 28,1% 0,59% 84,13% 4,70% 8,90% 3,00% 26367,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2007 12,8% 28,1% 0,55% 84,34% 4,80% 8,90% 2,60% 26666,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2007 13,6% 24,8% 0,52% 82,57% 5,10% 9,00% 2,80% 24409,90 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2006 13,3% 22,2% 0,63% 73,63% 5,40% 8,60% 3,20% 23176,10 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2006 11,6% 27,6% 0,55% 72,56% 5,50% 8,90% 3,10% 21125,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2006 12,4% 27,5% 0,47% 71,72% 5,90% 9,30% 3,40% 19996,90 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2006 13,2% 25,6% 0,40% 70,25% 6,00% 9,50% 3,30% 23387,80 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2005 13,3% 23,9% 0,14% 68,45% 6,20% 9,70% 3,50% 19138,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2005 14,0% 21,0% 0,72% 67,72% 6,30% 10,10% 3,80% 18147,70 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2005 14,9% 19,6% 0,74% 70,90% 6,50% 10,00% 3,20% 16569,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2005 11,1% 19,5% 0,77% 69,77% 6,80% 10,30% 2,80% 17555,50 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2004 14,0% 18,3% 0,65% 70,36% 7,00% 10,30% 3,10% 14549,80 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2004 14,7% 20,1% 0,68% 68,20% 6,90% 10,40% 2,90% 12413,60 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2004 14,9% 24,6% 0,60% 67,30% 7,00% 10,80% 3,00% 12818,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2004 15,1% 20,7% 0,60% 66,90% 6,90% 11,10% 2,90% 12755,30 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2003 14,6% 18,2% 0,57% 67,20% 7,00% 9,90% 3,10% 11002,00 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2003 13,1% 20,1% 0,58% 67,90% 7,10% 9,70% 3,30% 11210,10 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2003 12,6% 22,3% 0,50% 66,50% 7,15% 9,70% 3,70% 8541,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2003 10,4% 24,1% 0,55% 68,40% 7,20% 9,80% 3,90% 7871,70 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2002 9,8% 19,7% 0,49% 69,00% 7,20% 10,00% 3,50% 9146,10 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2002 9,3% 18,2% 0,45% 67,20% 6,90% 10,20% 3,80% 10827,80 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2002 9,5% 15,1% 0,50% 66,84% 6,30% 10,30% 3,60% 12179,60 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2002 9,0% 24,0% 0,63% 65,30% 5,80% 10,70% 4,30% 12640,40 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/12/2001 8,5% 26,4% 0,61% 66,10% 5,60% 10,80% 3,50% 14685,80 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/9/2001 9,5% 19,7% 0,58% 65,20% 5,40% 10,70% 4,00% 15449,20 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
30/6/2001 10,5% 18,9% 0,55% 64,50% 5,30% 10,50% 4,50% 18207,90 3 
Alpha 
Bank 
31/3/2001 10,0% 18,2% 0,53% 64,80% 5,00% 10,50% 3,20% 17879,80 3 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2015 14,7% -23,2% 3,26% 58,07% 34,35% 24,40% 0,40% 1883,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2015 12,6% -33,7% 3,54% 58,02% 34,50% 24,70% -0,80% 1822,60 4 
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Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2015 11,1% -49,3% 3,43% 58,58% 34,40% 25,10% -1,10% 2495,20 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2015 14,5% -29,1% 3,09% 58,31% 34,00% 25,80% -1,90% 2564,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2014 16,6% -30,6% 3,11% 58,83% 33,77% 25,90% -2,50% 3118,80 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2014 16,4% -33,7% 3,39% 60,29% 33,40% 26,20% -1,10% 3771,20 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2014 17,2% -36,5% 3,35% 60,68% 32,90% 27,00% -1,50% 3979,90 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2014 10,3% -289,9% 3,22% 60,85% 32,50% 27,10% -1,50% 4175,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2013 11,1% -221,3% 2,82% 61,20% 31,90% 27,50% -1,80% 3958,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2013 8,9% -54,4% 3,00% 61,13% 29,30% 27,90% -1,00% 3082,10 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2013 8,3% 73,8% 2,76% 67,98% 28,10% 27,80% -0,20% 3457,60 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2013 8,9% 36,4% 2,50% 74,42% 26,70% 27,10% -0,20% 3352,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2012 11,6% -328,8% 2,99% 73,02% 23,30% 26,40% 0,30% 2800,00 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2012 11,8% -837,7% 2,82% 70,74% 21,40% 26,10% 0,30% 2341,00 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2012 10,1% 656,3% 2,70% 71,50% 18,90% 24,90% 1,00% 1893,10 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2012 9,0% -337,2% 2,73% 72,30% 16,50% 22,60% 1,30% 3044,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2011 12,0% 375,6% 3,58% 73,35% 14,40% 21,30% 2,20% 2691,60 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2011 10,4% 2,6% 3,20% 72,60% 13,30% 19,10% 2,90% 3829,20 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2011 10,0% 2,5% 3,30% 70,50% 12,10% 17,30% 3,10% 5866,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2011 12,4% 3,0% 3,00% 69,58% 10,20% 16,00% 4,30% 7380,30 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2010 11,7% 1,6% 3,47% 70,86% 9,10% 14,70% 5,20% 6703,20 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2010 11,9% 2,0% 3,20% 70,95% 8,90% 13,40% 5,70% 7574,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2010 11,8% 4,7% 3,50% 71,60% 8,20% 12,50% 5,20% 7447,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2010 12,2% 6,2% 3,40% 72,50% 7,80% 11,60% 3,90% 9550,70 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2009 12,7% 7,7% 3,63% 72,27% 7,00% 10,70% 2,50% 11842,10 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2009 12,7% 6,8% 0,51% 73,37% 6,60% 9,90% 0,70% 13048,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2009 12,1% 8,9% 0,52% 70,27% 5,50% 9,40% 0,70% 12203,10 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2009 11,3% 12,6% 0,48% 72,80% 5,00% 9,10% 1,50% 7551,30 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2008 12,4% 15,7% 8,91% 73,81% 4,70% 8,60% 2,20% 9904,80 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2008 11,0% 19,7% 0,57% 75,16% 4,60% 7,60% 4,70% 18005,70 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2008 11,3% 24,1% 0,57% 74,79% 4,70% 7,40% 4,90% 22104,00 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2008 11,3% 23,6% 0,58% 74,69% 4,60% 8,20% 4,40% 21115,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2007 12,2% 23,6% 0,61% 73,52% 4,60% 8,30% 3,90% 27087,70 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2007 13,2% 21,0% 0,60% 74,90% 4,70% 8,90% 3,00% 26367,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2007 10,6% 25,4% 0,60% 71,49% 4,80% 8,90% 2,60% 26666,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2007 9,6% 23,0% 0,58% 71,06% 5,10% 9,00% 2,80% 24409,90 4 
Eurobank 31/12/2006 10,4% 23,2% 0,60% 68,85% 5,40% 8,60% 3,20% 23176,10 4 
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Ergasias 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2006 11,9% 24,2% 0,60% 69,28% 5,50% 8,90% 3,10% 21125,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2006 12,6% 25,5% 0,60% 67,08% 5,90% 9,30% 3,40% 19996,90 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2006 12,9% 22,7% 0,58% 67,03% 6,00% 9,50% 3,30% 23387,80 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2005 13,5% 21,7% 2,60% 66,74% 6,20% 9,70% 3,50% 19138,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2005 11,0% 21,4% 0,62% 70,15% 6,30% 10,10% 3,80% 18147,70 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2005 10,9% 19,5% 0,62% 68,74% 6,50% 10,00% 3,20% 16569,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2005 10,5% 17,9% 0,66% 68,61% 6,80% 10,30% 2,80% 17555,50 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2004 10,6% 20,6% 3,10% 66,59% 7,00% 10,30% 3,10% 14549,80 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2004 11,6% 17,4% 2,90% 65,30% 6,90% 10,40% 2,90% 12413,60 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2004 11,7% 17,2% 2,50% 66,50% 7,00% 10,80% 3,00% 12818,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2004 10,2% 15,9% 2,60% 67,90% 6,90% 11,10% 2,90% 12755,30 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2003 10,4% 14,9% 0,70% 64,80% 7,00% 9,90% 3,10% 11002,00 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2003 11,5% 24,0% 0,65% 63,40% 7,10% 9,70% 3,30% 11210,10 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2003 12,0% 19,0% 0,67% 62,60% 7,15% 9,70% 3,70% 8541,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2003 13,9% 16,3% 0,70% 62,90% 7,20% 9,80% 3,90% 7871,70 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2002 11,7% 14,1% 3,20% 63,20% 7,20% 10,00% 3,50% 9146,10 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2002 11,9% 15,6% 2,90% 60,50% 6,90% 10,20% 3,80% 10827,80 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2002 13,6% 14,6% 2,50% 59,60% 6,30% 10,30% 3,60% 12179,60 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2002 13,2% 16,4 3,00% 59,80% 5,80% 10,70% 4,30% 12640,40 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/12/2001 14,0% 17,6% 3,50% 59,00% 5,60% 10,80% 3,50% 14685,80 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/9/2001 13,9% 16,3% 3,10% 58,60% 5,40% 10,70% 4,00% 15449,20 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
30/6/2001 13,1% 16,9% 3,20% 59,40% 5,30% 10,50% 4,50% 18207,90 4 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
31/3/2001 12,5% 15,1% 2,90% 59,10% 5,00% 10,50% 3,20% 17879,80 4 
 
